Lobbying, Bargaining and EU Enlargement
AbstractThe past fifty years of European integration can be seen as the result of a two-level political game: at home national governments interacted strategically with organized interest groups, while in the European arena interstate distributional conflicts were solved by bargaining. Applying this scheme to the actual process of Enlargement to Eastern and Central European nations we show that, if there is a surplus from political integration, all countries receive a positive benefit from Enlargement. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, being the outcomes of the bargaining process shaped by relative power, our results suggest that EU members could gain more from Enlargement than entering countries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.
Volume (Year): 93 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-February)
Contact details of provider:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Ruta, Michele, 2003. "The allocation of competencies in an international union: a positive analysis," Working Paper Series 0220, European Central Bank.
- Federico Etro, 2004. "The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(3-4), pages 289-328, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabrina Marino).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.