The Theory Structure In Modern Historical Knowledge (As Exemplified By The Concepts Of The Causes Of The Red Army Defeat In The Initial Period Of The Great Patriotic War): Philosophical And Methodological Analysis[Структура Теории В Современном Историческом Познании (На Примере Концепций Причин Поражения Ркка В Начальный Период Великой Отечественной Войны): Философско-Методологический Анализ]

Introduction. The article considers some particular concepts of the causes of the Red Army defeat in 1941, which have been formed in the historiography of the USSR, Russia and beyond since the 20th century until now. These theories are studied as varieties of I. Lakatos’s research programs, which have some basic concepts (“solid core”) and consisting of the hypotheses “protective belt”. The author points out heuristic potential of each concept, its strengths and weaknesses in the methodological aspect. The aim of the study is to consider the concepts of the causes of the Red Army defeats in 1941 in modern historiography on the basis of the model of I. Lakatos’s research programs; compare these theoretical constructs with each other. Methods The author uses the following general scientific methods in the study: modeling, structuralfunctional, systemic and comparative analysis. The model of I. Lakatos’s research program is applied. As a means of cognition, counterfactual modeling of the past is involved. The scientific novelty of the study. The author studies the concepts of the causes of the Red Army defeat in 1941 on the basis of the model of I. Lakatos’s research program. The author reconstructs the “solid core” concept or basic concepts of these theories, the “protective belt” and its hypotheses and analyzes the structure of both the official doctrine of the “treacherous attack” and alternative theoretical constructions. Comparing the concepts makes it possible for the author to see the relationship of their “solid core” and “protective belt”. Results. In modern historiography, a number of theories of the Red Army defeat in 1941 are revealed: the official doctrine of “treacherous attack”, “preemptive strike”, mental, “conscious defeat”, economic-mental. These theoretical constructions act as opposites of each other in the worldview and ideology. However, theoretical and methodological analysis and comparison of these concepts made it possible to state that there is a common methodological basis for each of them. This is a set of basic provisions and a “protective belt” consisting of hypotheses. A complex set of interactions is revealed between these elements in each theoretical construction. The positive role of mutual criticism of theories as a means of obstructing the dogmatism of knowledge is noted. Conclusions. The concepts of the Red Army defeat in the summer of 1941 are only looking for common ground. The thesis confirms the fact of continuity of some basic provisions in each of them. The theories have a strong element of conspiracy theology. Hypotheses from the “protective belt” are often formed on the basis of the universal quantifier. This casts doubt on their truth in the case of empirical tests. Causal relationships are not always reasonably extrapolated from one period of the past to another. An exaggeration of I.V. Stalin’s role in the events. These theories demonstrate pluralism of positions on the issue under discussion. The analysis showed that these concepts need further theoretical and methodological improvement. It is noteworthy that the model of I. Lakatos’s research program, created mainly on the examples from the natural sciences, also works in the humanities.