Corruption in Russia: institutional foundations[Коррупция В России: Институциональные Основания]

The article shows that corruption is an immanent property and an attribute characteristic of the political regime prevailing in modern Russia. This is the regime of simulated democracy, in which declarative democratic institutions, procedures and practices are imitative in nature and are used no more than camouflage. Initially declared as democratic, the regime today lays claims to the irremovability of the supreme power, the nationalization of the economy, the suppression of political opposition and independent media, the deescalation of civil rights and freedoms, slipping into authoritarianism. The “driving belt” of authoritarian transformation in Russia has become the all-pervasive corruption in the sphere of public authority and its counterparties. The work shows the genesis and institutional bases of corruption in modern Russia. In the political sphere proper, corruption mechanisms and practices were most clearly manifested in electoral processes, which completely deformed the electoral process, turning political elections into their imitation. In the economy, this was due to the privatization of state property and the creation of state-controlled selected oligarchic groups, which, in their turn, did not simply enjoy the support of the state, but viewed the state as a source of income. This strengthened the already existing economic players’ demand for “bad” institutions, the presence of “gray zones” in state economic policy, the lack of transparency in the allocation of budget funds and corrupt practices. The decisive role of the bureaucracy in the allocation of public resources has led to the formation of a market of shadow administrative services and to the fact that the entire system of administrative management has become covered by the practice of administrative business. The ineffective symbiosis of Russian big business and the sovereign power thus has turned into an institutional trap: the state, no less than big business, has become interested in the existence of “bad” institutions and in the nontransparency of distributing resources that make it possible to effectively stand against any economic and political centers that are beyond the control of the authorities. It is concluded that corruption in modern Russia has acquired a systemic character, it is supported and reproduced by the ruling elite itself, ensuring its irremovability, and the current political regime is increasingly acquiring authoritarian features.