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Consent as the Foundation of Political Authority – A Lockean Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Frank Dietrich

    (Heinrich-Heine-Universitaet Duesseldorf)

Abstract

The article focuses on the justification provided by classical contract theory for the right of states to enact laws and the corresponding obligation of political allegiance. At first the distinction between political authority and parental authority developed by John Locke in his seminal work “Two Treatises of Government” is explored. Thereafter it is discussed why the interests of individuals in the creation of a state fail to vindicate the exercise of governmental power. As regards David Hume’s influential objections to contract theory, it is argued that the consent criterion of political legitimacy withstands his criticism. Hume cannot establish that the core idea of Locke’s justificatory approach is wrong; he merely demonstrates that hardly any existing state meets the consent requirement. Finally the question is discussed which conditions a state must fulfill in order to be entitled to claim that its citizens tacitly approve of its authority.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Dietrich, 2014. "Consent as the Foundation of Political Authority – A Lockean Perspective," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 5(85), October.
  • Handle: RePEc:rmm:journl:v:5:y:2014:i:85
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    File URL: http://www.rmm-journal.de/downloads/Article_Dietrich.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christine Chwaszcza, 2013. "Hume and the Social Contract: A Systematic Evaluation," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 4(73), October.
    2. Bernd Lahno, 2013. ""Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand?"–A New Debate on an Old Question," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 4(66), July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Authority; Consent; Contract Theory; David Hume; John Locke; Political Obligation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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