Giacinta Cestone () (Institut de Anàalisi Econòmica (CSIC), CSEF-Università di Salerno, and CEPR) Chiara Fumagalli () (Università Luigi Bocconi and CEPR)
Abstract
We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry deterrence. Also, resource flexibility within a group makes subsidiaries' reaction functions flatter, thus discouraging rivals' strategic commitments when entry is accommodated. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from https://pubs3.rand.org/cgi-bin/rje/pdf.cgi.
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Volume (Year): 36 (2005) Issue (Month): 4 (Winter) Pages: 193Ð214 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Xavier Boutin & Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Giovanni Pica & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009.
"The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets,"
CSEF Working Papers
217, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 05 Oct 2009.
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