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Mergers Under Entry

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Author Info
Martin Pesendorfer () (London School of Economics, CEPR, and NBER)

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Abstract

I study merger incentives in a dynamic model under the presence of gradual entry. I consider a repeated game with merger decisions in every period and characterize the set of equilibria. I establish two properties: (i) a merger for monopoly may not be profitable; (ii) a merger in a nonconcentrated industry can be profitable. I illustrate the merger welfare implications in the Cournot model. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from https://pubs3.rand.org/cgi-bin/rje/pdf.cgi.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 661-679
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:3:p:661-679

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  1. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, 2008. "Dynamic Merger Review," NBER Working Papers 14526, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 207-228, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Sällström, Susanna, 2009. "Functional Differentiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7187, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andrew F. Daughety, 2006. "Cournot Competition," Working Papers 0620, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicol? Porteiro, 2002. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 515.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Jiawei Chen, 2006. "The Effects of Mergers with Dynamic Capacity Accumulation," Working Papers 060701, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Zava Aydemir & Armin Schmutzler, 2002. "Acquisitions versus Entry: The Evolution of Concentration," Working Papers 0208, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Aug 2002. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

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