Mergers Under Entry
AbstractI study merger incentives in a dynamic model under the presence of gradual entry. I consider a repeated game with merger decisions in every period and characterize the set of equilibria. I establish two properties: (i) a merger for monopoly may not be profitable; (ii) a merger in a nonconcentrated industry can be profitable. I illustrate the merger welfare implications in the Cournot model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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- Aydemir, Zava & Schmutzler, Armin, 2008. "Small scale entry versus acquisitions of small firms: Is concentration self-reinforcing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 133-146, January.
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