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The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business Groups

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Author Info

  • Giacinta Cestone

    ()
    (Institut d'Analisi Economica (CSIC), CSEF-Universita` di Salerno, CEPR)

  • Chiara Fumagalli

    ()
    (Universita` Bocconi)

Abstract

We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry deterrence. Also, resource flexibility within a group makes subsidiaries' reaction functions flatter, thus discouraging rivals' strategic commitments when entry is accommodated.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 193-214

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:193-214

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Related research

Keywords: Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy; cost of capital Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure; financial ratios; value of firm Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates Capital; Firm; Firms; Subsidiary;

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Cited by:
  1. Berg, Aron & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2012. "International Mergers with Financially Constrained Owners," Working Paper Series 927, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Christa Hainz, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Financial Control and Sequential Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 336-355, June.
  3. Xavier, Wlamir Gonçalves & Bandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo & Marcon, Rosilene, 2014. "Institutional environment and Business Groups' resilience in Brazil," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(5), pages 900-907.
  4. Xavier Boutin & Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Giovanni Pica & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2011. "The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets," Working Papers 403, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  5. Flaxio Toxvaerd, 2005. "Mergers, Diversification and Financial Intermediation," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 43, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  6. Curtiss, Jarmila, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and implications for rural businesses," Factor Markets Working Papers 123, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  7. Christa Hainz, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets-Financial Control & Sequential Investment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp830, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  8. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(2), pages 331-372, June.
  9. Löffler, Clemens & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2013. "Centralized versus Decentralized External Financing, Winner Picking and Corporate Socialism," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79902, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  10. Giacomo Rodano & Emanuele Tarantino & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2012. "Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of Banking Finance," Working Papers 1218, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.

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