We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry deterrence. Also, resource flexibility within a group makes subsidiaries' reaction functions flatter, thus discouraging rivals' strategic commitments when entry is accommodated. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from https://pubs3.rand.org/cgi-bin/rje/pdf.cgi.
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Volume (Year): 36 (2005) Issue (Month): 1 (Spring) Pages: 193-214 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Xavier Boutin & Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Giovanni Pica & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009.
"The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets,"
CSEF Working Papers
217, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 05 Oct 2009.
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