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Multi-unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from the Fast-Food Industry in Texas

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Author Info
Arturs Kalnins () (University of Southern California)
Francine Lafontaine () (University of Michigan)

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Abstract

Using data on all restaurants opened in Texas between 1980 and 1995 by seven large U.S. fast-food chains, we examine the extent of multi-unit ownership among franchisees and analyze how franchisors allocate the ownership of new units. We show that franchisees with nearby units are much more likely to be assigned ownership of a new unit. Further, controlling for distance, franchisees are more likely to obtain a new unit whose market is contiguous and demographically similar to those surrounding their existing units. Finally, franchisors use these same criteria to select those units to retain as company owned.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 747-761
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:4:p:747-761

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Related research
Keywords: Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism Franchising; Restaurants;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism

Cited by:
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  1. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2002. "The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting," NBER Working Papers 8868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Clarissa Yeap, 2006. "Residual Claims and Incentives in Restaurant Chains," Working Papers 06-18, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.


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