Private Information, Strategic Behavior, and Efficiency in Cournot Markets
AbstractWhen analyzing a Cournot market with strictly convex costs dependent on a private information parameter, do we err more by ignoring market power or by ignoring the impact of incomplete information? Is the welfare loss at the market outcome driven by private information or by market power? The answer to both questions is that in large enough markets, abstracting from market power provides a much better approximation than abstracting from private information. Let n index the size of the market and the (free entry) number of firms. Then the effect of market power (private information) is of the order of 1/n (1/√n) for prices and 1/n
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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