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Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy

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  • Vincenzo Denicol�
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    Abstract

    I analyze the optimal degree of forward patent protection in a two-stage patent race framework. I compare three patent regimes, as the second innovation may be unpatentable and infringing (UI), patentable and infringing (PI), or patentable and not infringing (PN). Forward protection is highest in regime UI and lowest in regime PN. I identify a fundamental inefficiency affecting regime UI, namely that it always leads to underinvestment in the second innovation, and I note various determinants of the welfare ranking of the regimes. Specifically, strong forward protection becomes less attractive as the relative profitability of the first innovation increases and the relative difficulty of obtaining it decreases.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 31 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
    Pages: 488-501

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    Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:autumn:p:488-501

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    Cited by:
    1. Robert M. Hunt, 2002. "Patentability, industry structure, and innovation," Working Papers 01-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    2. Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April.
    3. Gilbert, Richard J & Katz, Michael L, 2009. "Efficient Division of Profits from Complementary Innovations," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt5mr0s11v, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    4. Payot, Frederic & Szalay, Dezsö, 2008. "Sequential Innovations and Intellectual Property Rights," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 864, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Liad Wagman & Vincent Conitzer, 2012. "Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 91-129, February.

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