Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy
AbstractI analyze the optimal degree of forward patent protection in a two-stage patent race framework. I compare three patent regimes, as the second innovation may be unpatentable and infringing (UI), patentable and infringing (PI), or patentable and not infringing (PN). Forward protection is highest in regime UI and lowest in regime PN. I identify a fundamental inefficiency affecting regime UI, namely that it always leads to underinvestment in the second innovation, and I note various determinants of the welfare ranking of the regimes. Specifically, strong forward protection becomes less attractive as the relative profitability of the first innovation increases and the relative difficulty of obtaining it decreases.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Wagman, Liad & Conitzer, Vincent, 2008.
"Choosing Fair Lotteries to Defeat the Competition,"
10375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2011.
"Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 443-454, July.
- Gilbert, Richard J & Katz, Michael L, 2009. "Efficient Division of Profits from Complementary Innovations," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt5mr0s11v, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Payot, Frederic & Szalay, Dezsö, 2008. "Sequential Innovations and Intellectual Property Rights," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 864, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- David A. Miller, 2005.
"Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry,"
Industrial Organization, EconWPA
- Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April.
- Robert M. Hunt, 2004.
"Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 401-425, 09.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.