When capacity is costly and prices are set in advance, firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price. I show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion. Moreover, as the market becomes more competitive, prices become more dispersed, a pattern documented in the airline industry. While generating similar predictions, the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers.
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Volume (Year): 30 (1999) Issue (Month): 4 (Winter) Pages: 632-660 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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ANDERSON, Simon & de PALMA, AndrŽ, 2003.
"Price dispersion,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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