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Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts

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Author Info
Charles M. Kahn
Dilip Mookherjee

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Abstract

We consider a common agency context where socially desired exclusive dealing clauses cannot be enforced. Customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance contracts from multiple risk-neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is subject to moral hazard arising from a common noncontractible effort decision. Outcomes of a class of Markov equilibria are characterized by a corresponding notion of constrained efficiency. These may involve more rationing than in a context of exclusive contracts. Increases in public provision or competition can result in increased prices on the private market, owing to an induced reduction in customer effort.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 443-465
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:autumn:p:443-465

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  1. Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts," Economics Working Papers 345, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "A theory of an intermediary with nonexclusive contracting," Working Papers 05-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2006. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," PSE Working Papers 2006-51, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  4. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  5. ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwena‘l, 2005. "Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market," CORE Discussion Papers 2005031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Darren Filson, 2003. "Dynamic Common Agency, Vertical Integration, and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-07, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  7. Yaron Leitner, 2009. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 09-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  8. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2006. "Hedge markets for executives and corporate agency," CORE Discussion Papers 2006009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  9. Matthias Blonski & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2008. "Excess Returns and the Distinguished Player Paradox," cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 78, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany)., revised 27 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  10. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2003. "Competitive Markets for Non-Exclusive Contracts with Adverse Selection: the Role of Entry Fees," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 313-338, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2004. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Bisin, Alberto & Gottardi, Piero, 1997. "General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 97-38, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  13. repec:bep:thecon:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1253-1253 is not listed on IDEAS
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  14. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Benefits of Extended Liability," IDEI Working Papers 334, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
  15. Agar Brugiavini & Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market," Working Papers 2006_39, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Bennardo, Alberto & Pagano, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2009. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2009. "Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," IDEI Working Papers 558, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  19. Yaron Leitner, 2004. "Non-Exclusive Contracts, Collateralized Trade, and a Theory of an Exchange," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 397, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  20. Edward S. Prescott & John A. Weinberg, 2000. "Incentives, communication, and payment instruments," Working Paper 00-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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  21. repec:bep:thetop:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1358-1358 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Yaron Leitner, 2003. "Non-exclusive contracts, collateralized trade, and a theory of an exchange," Working Papers 03-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
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