An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism
AbstractThis is a systematic experimental comparison of the efficiency and competitive properties of a computerized multiunit tatonnement with or without a dynamic improvement rule, with or without publicity of order flow information. All versions of the tatonnement are comparatively less efficient than the continuous double auction. The tatonnement yields competitive prices, but both sides tend to underreveal demand/supply, causing inefficiency. Only the full-information, no-improvement-rule version of the tatonnement procedure approaches the efficiency of the double auction.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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Other versions of this item:
- Bronfman, Corinne & McCabe, Kevin & Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon, 1992. "An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism," Working Papers 824, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Rajkamal Iyer & Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Kelly Shue, 2009.
"Screening Peers Softly: Inferring the Quality of Small Borrowers,"
NBER Working Papers
15242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Iyer, Rajkamal & Khwaja, Asim Ijaz & Luttmer, Erzo F. P. & Shue, Kelly, 2013. "Screening Peers Softly: Inferring the Quality of Small Borrowers," Working Paper Series rwp13-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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