The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading
AbstractThough lawyers and economists have speculated about the consequences of effective insider regulation, empirical research has yet to establish whether the regulation of insiders is even effective. Following the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933-1934, the most significant changes in insider regulation have occurred through a few important decisions in case law. This study examines the changes in the volume and profitability of insider trading after each of three important legal decisions concerning insiders. No. significant change in the properties of insider trading was observed following any of these three events. In addition, there appeared to be no combined effect from the three decisions. Thus it is concluded that the null hypothesis that changes in regulation had no effect on the trading of insiders cannot be rejected.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1974)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F., 1995. "Does Section 16b deter insider trading by target managers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 295-319.
- Wielhouwer, Jacco L., 2013. "When is public enforcement of insider trading regulations effective?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 52-60.
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