The Economics of Product Safety and Imperfect Information
AbstractIn an earlier article in the Bell Journal, Walter Oi analyzed the economics of product safety. His primary emphasis was on a full information model. However, since product safety is only a problem if consumer information is inadequate, policy implications of a full information analysis are suspect. This paper stresses the importance of treating product bans and liability rules as part of the consumer's information processing system.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1974)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Ram Singh, 2008.
"Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability: An Enquiry into Conflicting Objectives,"
- Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, 02.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Leathers, Howard D., 1979. "A Primer On Nutrition Policy In The United States," Staff Papers 13268, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
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