It has been suggested in the economics literature that strongly risk-averse individuals may tend to gravitate toward large monopolistic firms rather than work for more competitive companies. In this article we provide results of an experiment designed to test this hypothesis. Operating managers from both regulated telecommunications firms and a broad cross section of unregulated industrial and service corporations were placed in the same controlled decision context to examine whether there are any systematic differences between telecommunications managers and their counterparts in nonregulated companies in their risk attitude toward losses.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 14 (1983) Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn) Pages: 517-521 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF