Provider insurance is insurance offered by the provider of a product or service against losses or damages incurred in connection with the use of that product or service. It is demonstrated that a rate-setting agency, with no information about consumers, can design a provider-insurance mechanism that induces both the provider and the consumer to reduce losses efficiently, and, at the same time, transfers risk from the (risk-averse) consumer to the (risk-neutral) provider without moral hazard. The structure of the optimal provider-insurance mechanism is derived. The optimal mechanism must be imposed on a noncompetitive industry by regulators, but it can arise spontaneously in competitive industries and can be sustained.
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Volume (Year): 14 (1983) Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn) Pages: 489-496 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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