A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems
Abstract
Property-liability insurance is distributed through two major marketing channels -- the independent and the exclusive agency systems. Independent agents place business with several companies, while exclusive agents write insurance for only one company. We find that the independent agency system is less efficient than the exclusive agency system. The efficiency differential did not change significantly during the period 1968 through 1976. When we used the total rather than the underwriting costs to measure expenses, we found that the relative but not the absolute expense differential was reduced. This suggests that the inefficiencies of the independent agency companies stem from marketing and administrative rather than loss adjustment procedures. The findings imply that regulators should play a more active role in the dissemination of information on property-liability insurance prices.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (1979)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 709-719
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Lucinda Trigo Gamarra, 2007. "Does the Product Quality Hypothesis Hold True? - Service Quality Differences between Independent and Exclusive Insurance Agents," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 76, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany.
- Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Shuntian Yao, 1994.
"Insurance Market Games: Scale Effects and Public Policy,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1076, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michael Powers & Martin Shubik & Shun Yao, 1998. "Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 109-134, June.
- Steven Raphael & Lorien Rice, 2000.
"Car Ownership, Employment, and Earnings,"
JCPR Working Papers
179, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
- Raphael, Steven & Rice, Lorien, 2002. "Car ownership, employment, and earnings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 109-130, July.
- Andrew C. Worthington & Emily V. Hurley, 2000. "Technical, allocative and cost efficiency in the Australian general insurance industry," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 074, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2005.
"Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice,"
NBER Working Papers
11461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2007. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 745-788, June.
- Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2005. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," Discussion Papers 04-031, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Martina Eckardt & Solvig Räthke-Döppner, 2010.
"The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services-Empirical Evidence for Germany,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance,
The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 667-701.
- Eckardt, Martina & Räthke-Döppner, Solvig, 2008. "The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services – Empirical Evidence for Germany," MPRA Paper 10703, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Felder, Stefan, 1996. "Fire insurance in Germany: A comparison of price-performance between state monopolies and competitive regions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1133-1141, April.
- Lucinda Trigo Gamarra, 2007. "Single- versus Multi-Channel Distribution Strategies in the German Life Insurance Market: A Cost and Profit Efficiency Analysis," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 81, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany.
- Outreville, J. François & Proulx, Carol, 1985. "Fusions et économies de dimension sur le marché des assurances générales au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(3), pages 350-361, septembre.
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