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U.S. executive-branch transgressions in the depth of the 2007-09 financial crisis

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Abstract

Policy measures and practices adopted from September 2008 into 2009 have left troubling legacies for the U.S. economy as executive discretion in economic governance became elevated and centralized. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (the Treasury or UST), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting in tandem, claimed emergency authority to prop up the financial system. This paper shows how resulting government improvisations (1) needlessly preferred discretionary operations over rules in some instances, (2) treated contracts with private parties as preliminary and non-binding on those parties in other instances, and (3) further biased the allocation of capital toward the residential sector. Economic order, capital-market efficiency, and economic-growth potential may suffer lasting damages from these transgressions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Capco Institute in its journal Journal of Financial Transformation.

Volume (Year): 27 (2009)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 29-34

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Handle: RePEc:ris:jofitr:1381

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Keywords: Economic policy; capital market efficiency;

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