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Design of an Antidumping Rule with Incomplete Information about Material Injury

Author

Listed:
  • Kohler, Philippe

    (University of Montpellier)

  • O. Moore, Michael

    (The George Washington University)

Abstract

This paper deals with the inability of an administering authority to directly observe the level of material injury in antidumping petitions. We focus on the use, by the domestic firm, of private information about injury in order to obtain higher protection. By using an incentive framework, we show that asym - metric information about the level of injury can be resolved by using a mix of lump-sum compensation, domestic unit taxes and antidumping duties rather than just import duties. Surprisingly, the lump-sum transfer decreases and the domestic unit tax increases with the level of material injury. This efficient antidumping rule will induce the domestic firm to tell the truth about the level of material injury.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohler, Philippe & O. Moore, Michael, 1998. "Design of an Antidumping Rule with Incomplete Information about Material Injury," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 13, pages 62-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:integr:0066
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Philippe Kohler & Michael O. Moore, 2001. "Injury‐Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(1), pages 42-59, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antidumping; Rule;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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