International Joint Ventures and Endogenous Protection: A Political-Economy Approach
AbstractThis paper constructs a model of international joint ventures (JVs) with political-economy considerations as the main motivation. A foreign firm decides whether to undertake full ownership foreign direct investment (FDI), or to form a JV with a home firm, while the home firm lobbies against FDI. It is shown that the level of lobbying is lower in the JV regime than in the FDI regime if the foreign firm transfer sufficiently advanced technology to the home firm through the JV. However, if the foreign firm anticipates future protectionist threats and forms a JV with the home firm beforehand (quid pro quo JV), then the foreign firm’s profit increases and the home firm’s level of lobbying decreas - es.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University in its journal Journal of Economic Integration.
Volume (Year): 12 (1997)
Issue (Month): ()
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jong-Eun Lee).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.