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Ownership Concentration, Board Structure and Credit Risk:The Case of MENA Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Rim Boussaada

    (FSJEG Jendouba, University of Jendouba, Institute of Management)

  • Daniel Labaronne

    (LARE-efi, University of Montesquieu Bordeaux IV)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of ownership concentration and board characteristics on MENA banks’ credit risk over the period 2004-2011. The sample includes 38 commercial banks belonging to ten countries of the MENA region. We use an econometric method that deals with the endogeneity problems that have arisen in the corporate governance literature. We show that ownership concentration is significant in explaining credit risk differences between MENA banks. Indeed, banks with highly concentrated ownership have a higher credit risk. However board size and CEO duality are not significant in explaining credit risk differences between MENA banks. In addition, the results highlight the fact that the independence of directors is not relevant to explaining risk-taking in MENA banks. We find that state directors exacerbate credit risk while institutional directors fulfill the functions of monitoring of the bank’s credit policy. Finally, our findings highlight the importance of the number of board committees in enhancing banks’ credit quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Rim Boussaada & Daniel Labaronne, 2015. "Ownership Concentration, Board Structure and Credit Risk:The Case of MENA Banks," Bankers, Markets & Investors, ESKA Publishing, issue 139, pages 5-18, November-.
    • Handle: RePEc:rbq:journl:i:139:p:5-18
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Belaid, Faiçal & Boussaada, Rim & Belguith, Houda, 2017. "Bank-firm relationship and credit risk: An analysis on Tunisian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 532-543.
    2. Doğan Berna & Ekşi İbrahim Halil, 2020. "The effect of board of directors characteristics on risk and bank performance: Evidence from Turkey," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 6(3), pages 88-104, August.
    3. Rim Boussaada & Aymen Ammari & Nouha Ben Arfa, 2018. "Board characteristics and MENA banks' credit risk: A fuzzy-set analysis," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2284-2303.
    4. Rim Boussaada & Abdelaziz Hakimi & Majdi Karmani, 2022. "Is there a threshold effect in the liquidity risk–non‐performing loans relationship? A PSTR approach for MENA banks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 1886-1898, April.
    5. Ines Ghazouani & Nadia Basty, 2023. "Is the relationship between bank stability, competition, and intervention quality nonlinear? Evidence from North African countries," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 35(1), pages 38-51, March.
    6. Berna Doğan Başar & Ahmed Bouteska & Burak Büyükoğlu & İbrahim Halil Ekşi, 2021. "The effect of corporate governance on bank performance: evidence from Turkish and some MENA countries banks," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(3), pages 153-162, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank Governance; Ownership Concentration; Board of Directors; Credit Risk; MENA Banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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