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Subastas simultaneas de bienes identicos mediante el mecanismo del primer precio con premio para los compradores

Author

Listed:
  • Karla Flores-Zarur

    (Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad Autonoma de San Luis Potosi.)

  • William Olvera-Lopez

    (Universidad Autonoma de San Luis Potosi.)

Abstract

Estudiar, desde el punto de vista del vendedor, la manera de subastar un conjunto finito de bienes identicos donde se otorga un cierto premio al postor que obtenga el conjunto completo de bienes, tomando en cuenta el comportamiento estrategico de los postores. Se modela la situacion como un juego bayesiano considerando el espacio de estrategias de cada jugador como Rm+. Se muestra un equilibrio bayesiano simetrico y se demuestra que el vendedor es indiferente entre algunas maneras de ofrecer la utilidad extra, al obtener el mismo rendimiento esperado. El modelo solo considera el caso de bienes identicos. Se encuentra la puja de equilibrio para un caso de m subastas simultáneas y n postores, bajo el mecanismo del primer precio considerando utilidad extra modeladas mediante juegos bayesianos. Los cambios en el rendimiento esperado del vendedor no son sensibles ante algunas maneras de otorgar el incentivo.

Suggested Citation

  • Karla Flores-Zarur & William Olvera-Lopez, 2022. "Subastas simultaneas de bienes identicos mediante el mecanismo del primer precio con premio para los compradores," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 19(2), pages 83-92, Julio-Dic.
    • Handle: RePEc:qua:journl:v:19:y:2022:i:2:p:83-92
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subastas Simultaneas; Mecanismo del Primer Precio; Juegos Bayesianos; Equilibrio Bayesiano Simetrico; Rendimeinto Esperado del Vendedor.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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