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La Bundesbank : une orthodoxie pragmatique

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  • Andrew Brociner
  • Odile Chagny
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    Abstract

    [eng] The Bundesbank: a pragmatic orthodoxy Andrew Brociner, Odile Chagny The Bundesbank is widely associated with the setting of monetary aggregates, based on its reliance on the quantitative theory of money. In adopting this theory, however, its approach remains pragmatic, as the preservation of the value of money takes priority over the more strict interpretation of the quantity theory. Followed rigourously, the quantity theory would prescribe that the use of monetary policy be assigned to the pursuit of price stability, to the exclusion of other objectives, such as unemployment. The Bundesbank, however, in its more pragmatic approach, and following its objective of preserving the value of money, intervenes continuously in the inflation- unemployment trade-off. This empirical finding highlights its reactions to short-run shocks. Far from relying exclusively on the setting of monetary aggregates in an effort to maintain price stability in the long-run, the Bundesbank favours a more short term intervention to preserve the value of its currency. [fre] Les commentaires et analyses relatifs à l'action de la Bundesbank mettent généralement en exergue le rôle des agrégats monétaires. La Bundesbank y contribue au premier chef, en donnant à son discours un fort accent quantitativiste. L'antériorité de l'adoption d'une politique monétaire axée sur le respect d'objectifs quantitatifs (fin 1974) et les performances de l'Allemagne en termes d'inflation ont fait le reste. Si la théorie quantitative de la monnaie a en quelque sorte gagné ses lettres de noblesse avec la Bundesbank, c'est pourtant grâce à une approche non dogmatique de la théorie que l'Allemagne n'a jamais en fait connu d'épisode monétariste pur (du type de celui expérimenté par la Fed au début des années quatre-vingt). La Bundesbank privilégie plutôt une approche pragmatique, selon laquelle le respect de l'objectif final de préservation de la valeur de la monnaie que lui assignent ses statuts prime sur l'interprétation dogmatique de la théorie quantitative de la monnaie. Reconnu et revendiqué par la Bundesbank, ce pragmatisme fonde sa fonction de réaction et a des implications spécifiques. L'attachement à la théorie quantitative de long terme, grâce à laquelle la théorie monétaire « possède (un) fondement solide »\ dicte à la politique monétaire de se consacrer exclusivement à la stabilité des prix et donc de ne pas inclure le chômage dans sa fonction objectif. Or, le respect de sa mission incite la Bundesbank à intervenir en permanence dans l'arbitrage entre inflation et chômage. Ce constat, empirique, soulève le problème de la réaction aux chocs de court terme. Suivies à la lettre, les conclusions que tire la Bundesbank de la théorie monétaire concluent à la neutralité d'une banque centrale à l'égard des chocs non monétaires, l'inflation restant, à long terme, un phénomène monétaire. Les conditions concrètes dans lesquelles interviennent les chocs de court terme poussent cependant la Bundesbank, pragmatiquement attachée à la stabilité de la valeur de la monnaie, à intervenir activement.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

    Volume (Year): 56 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 95-119

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1996_num_56_1_1417

    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1996.1417
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    Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ofce

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    Cited by:
    1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3004 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jérôme Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 1999. "La politique monétaire sans monnaie," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 111-153.
    3. Jérôme Creel & Jacky Fayolle, 2002. "La Banque centrale européenne ou le Seigneur des euros," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2967, Sciences Po.
    4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2961 is not listed on IDEAS

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