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Retraite choisie et réduction des déficits

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Author Info

  • Jean-Olivier Hairault
  • François Langot
  • Thepthida Sopraseuth

Abstract

[fre] Jean-Olivier Hairault François Langot Thepthida Sopraseuth Retraite choisie et réduction des déficits. Nous proposons un modèle de cycle de vie où les décisions de départ à la retraite sont endogènes, ainsi que les choix de consommation et d'épargne, dans un environnement marqué par des risques de chômage en fin de vie active et une incertitude sur la date de mort. A partir d'un calibrage fin du système des retraites du secteur privé, nous montrons dans un premier temps que notre stratégie de modélisation permet de répliquer les distributions observées des départs en retraite et l'équilibre actuel des caisses de retraite (régime général et régimes complémentaires). Nous étudions ensuite les incidences de l'introduction d'incitations à reculer le départ en retraite, au regard de mesures plus réglementaires comme l'augmentation de la durée minimale de cotisation. Actuellement la prolongation d'activité au-delà du taux plein est taxée implicitement à 1 00 % dans le régime général. Nous cherchons le taux de taxe qui permet de maximiser les revenus des caisses de retraite en arbitrant de façon optimale entre le nombre d'individus prolongeant leur activité et le prélèvement sur ces individus. Nous montrons que le sommet de la courbe de Laffer est obtenu pour un prélèvement de 20 % sur la surcote actuariellement neutre. Selon les scénarios envisagés, de 10 % à 35 % des déficits attendus en 2040 pourraient être financés par un système de surcotes en-deçà naturellement des niveaux actuariellement neutres, ce qui correspond à une augmentation de la durée de cotisation entre 3 et 14 trimestres. Relativement à la surcote uniforme de 3 % préconisée par le gouvernement Raffarin, des surcotes indexées sur l'espérance de vie, mais surtout bénéficiant du rendement des marchés financiers, apparaissent beaucoup plus performantes. [eng] Funding the French Social Security Through Incentive Schemes This paper develops a life cycle model with endogenous retirement decisions and consumption - savings choices in a quantitative Markovian overlapping generation model with altruistic individuals and incomplete financial markets. The only risk tic : elder workers face a risk of being pre-retired or unemployed, which results in a lower income ; the elderly face an uncertain time of death ; a child can be born in a lower social category than his father's. Individuals choose each year whether to retire or not the following year. Their decisions are based on expected income, life expectancy and their personal level of wealth. We first show that the model is consistent with the retirement distribution as well as the contribution rates as observed in France nowadays. We then compare the impact of two alternative reforms aiming at delaying retirement : a mandatory lenghtening of the contributive period versus incentive schemes (additional pension when retirement is postponed). The current Social Security provisions impose a 100 % implicit tax on continued work beyond the full rate. We look for the optimal tax rate that maximizes Social Security revenues. We then face a trade-off between the number of individuals who delay retirement and the level of implicit tax on continued work. This tradeoff is captured by a Laffer curve whose top is reached with an implicit tax of 20 % on the actuarially fair scheme. We find that 10 to 35 % of the expected Social Security deficit can be financed through incentives, which corresponds to a mandatory lenghtening of the contribution of 3 to 14 quarters. Incentives relying on life expectancy, especially when combined with financial returns, are more effective than the constant marginal increase in pension of 3 % proposed by the Raffarin governement.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.2004.1530
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/rfeco_0769-0479_2004_num_18_3_1530/rfeco_0769-0479_2004_num_18_3_1530.pdf?mode=light
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 18 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 75-136

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2004_num_18_3_1530

Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2004.1530
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/rfeco

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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Olivier Hairault & François Langot & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2006. "Le double dividende des politiques incitatives à l'allongement de la durée de vie active," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 449-460.

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