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L'économique politique simplifiée du « mammouth »

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Author Info

  • Alain Trannoy
  • Robert Gary-Bobo

Abstract

[fre] Nous proposons un modèle exploratoire des relations contractuelles entre l'Etat et les universités. Nous considérons plus particulièrement le cas d'une université en situation de monopole local pour la délivrance d'un diplôme à caractère professionnel, faisant face à des étudiants supposés identiques. L'université et le ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur entretiennent une relation d'agence caractérisée par le risque moral : la tutelle n'observe pas le niveau d'effort fourni par la communauté universitaire pour améliorer la qualité de l'enseignement. Cet effort est supposé exercer des effets, aussi bien sur le taux de placement des diplômés que sur la demande de formation émanant des étudiants. Nous montrons que les normes Sanremo, utilisées pour le calcul des dotations de l'Etat aux universités, induisent un comportement de « sélection par l'échec » de la part des responsables universitaires. A un système de subvention fondé sur la rémunération des effectifs étudiants, nous proposons de substituer un système incitatif, faisant dépendre les dotations du nombre de diplômés qui ont obtenu un emploi. [eng] We propose an exploratory model of the contractual relationships of Universities and the State. We more particularly consider the case of a University with local monopoly power, which grants a « professional » degree, and facing identical students. The University and the Ministery of Higher Education are linked by an agency relationship characterized by a moral hazard problem : the Principal does not observe the effort expanded by the teachers to improve teaching quality. The academic effort variable is assumed to affect both the demand for studies and the rate of employment of students. We show that the system used in France to compute the amounts of public financing of Universities induces perverse incentives and can be held responsible for some majore inefficiencies (in particular the process known as « screening by means of failure »). We propose a reform in which the amount of public funding would depend on the number of students who graduate and find a job.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.1998.1062
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_3_1062/rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_3_1062.pdf?mode=light
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 13 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 85-126

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_3_1062

Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1998.1062
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/rfeco

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Cited by:
  1. Pier-Andre Bouchard St-Amant, 2013. "University Funding Policies: Buildings or Citizens?," Working Papers 1302, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

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