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L'application des concepts de «lock-in » et de « barrières à la mobilité » à une théorie des réseaux d'entreprises

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  • Paul Bouvier-Patron
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    Abstract

    [fre] Notre intention est d'articuler quatre concepts de la théorie de l'Économie Industrielle afin de proposer une analyse de l'organisation industrielle en termes de réseaux d'entreprises. Pour ce faire, il convient de réinterpréter ces concepts et de distinguer l'amont de l'aval (par rapport à l'output du réseau). Le réseau est une association, en amont, de plusieurs acteurs complémentaires cherchant à réaliser un output (qui sera vendu sur le marché comme produit). Se pose la question de la nature de cette association. Si la mobilité est trop grande (par analogie à la situation de marché contestable, cf. Baumol et allii [1977]) l'association n'est que virtuelle et la logique de court terme prévaut. Si un pouvoir coercitif est exercé (ou «lock-in» relationnel, cf. Schelling [1956]), il y a risque de blocage du réseau. Il faut donc stabiliser suffisamment l'association pour permettre un apprentissage relationnel (ce qui est impossible en cas d'une trop grande mobilité) sans cependant entraver la mobilité des acteurs. Pour ce faire, les barrières à la mobilité (cf. Caves et Porter [1977]) constituent une avancée significative, mais on privilégie alors trop le caractère matériel (de type «sunk costs»). Nous insistons ici sur les barrières informelles à la mobilité à partir du concept de mécanisme d'incitation à la stabilité : il s'agit d'une barrière informelle à la mobilité permettant de préserver la spécificité du réseau en tenant compte de la contrainte d'information croissante. Le problème le plus important qu'elle permet de résoudre est le suivant : si un acteur monopolistique à cheval sur plusieurs réseaux concurrents délivre, en amont, une prestation identique alors que cette prestation est fondamentale dans le produit de chaque réseau, il y aura un effet très négatif se traduisant par une tendance à l'homogénéité des produits sur le marché aval. Cet effet négatif est lié à des rendements croissants d'adoption en amont. Par ailleurs, il existe un effet positif des rendements croissants d'adoption sur le marché aval en raison de l'adoption croissante du produit d'un réseau particulier et c'est ce seul qui est pris en compte dans la littérature (cf. Arthur [1989]). [eng] The aim of this paper is to combine four concepts of Industrial Economics (contestability, relational lock- in, barriers to mobility and increasing returns to adoption) in order to implement an analysis in terms of network. A network must be understood as an association of many actors linked together because of their complementarities in producing. The point which must be stressed is the nature of the association. When the mobility of actors is too important, association is weak. However, coercition in network will induce a global lock-in. A barrier must then exist to stabilize the association sufficiently without impeding mobility. Barriers to mobility are then very helpful. We focused our attention mainly on informal barriers to mobility (i.e the mechanism of incitation to stability). To understand why these barriers are so important, we have to take into account rivalry between networks : increasing returns to adoption is a powerful tool to explain that. The question which has to be dealt with is the specific part played by transborder actors who sell the same transaction to rivals when this transaction, incorporated in any network output, makes these outputs homogeneous. [ger] Paul Bouvier-Patron The application of the concepts of relational lock-in and barriers to mobility to the theory of network. The aim of this paper is to combine four concepts of Industrial Economics (contestability, relational lock- in, barriers to mobility and increasing returns to adoption) in order to implement an analysis in terms of network. A network must be understood as an association of many actors linked together because of their complementarities in producing. The point which must be stressed is the nature of the association. When the mobility of actors is too important, association is weak. However, coercition in network will induce a global lock-in. A barrier must then exist to stabilize the association sufficiently without impeding mobility. Barriers to mobility are then very helpful. We focused our attention mainly on informal barriers to mobility (i.e the mechanism of incitation to stability). To understand why these barriers are so important, we have to take into account rivalry between networks : increasing returns to adoption is a powerful tool to explain that. The question which has to be dealt with is the specific part played by transborder actors who sell the same transaction to rivals when this transaction, incorporated in any network output, makes these outputs homogeneous.

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.1994.950
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    File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/rfeco_0769-0479_1994_num_9_1_950/rfeco_0769-0479_1994_num_9_1_950.pdf?mode=light
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

    Volume (Year): 9 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 205-232

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1994_num_9_1_950

    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1994.950
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    Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/rfeco

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