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Modernisation de la politique communautaire de concurrence. Régime d'autorisation ou d'exception légale?

Author

Listed:
  • Fabian Bergès-Sennou
  • Frédéric Loss
  • Estelle Malavolti-Grimal
  • Thibaud Vergé

Abstract

[eng] European competition policy reform: autorisation or exemption regime?. . The European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and to focus on a regime of ex post investigation.. Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. When the precision of the competition authority's analysis is not high enough, an ex ante control, like the notification System, is preferable. On the other hand, if decision accuracy improves, an ex post investigation regime achieves a higher social welfare. [fre] Modernisation de la politique communautaire de concurrence. . La Commission européenne s'est récemment posé la question de la modernisation du traitement des accords entre entreprises. Elle souhaite modifier le système actuel de contrôle des accords par notifications, au profit d'une répression ex-post.. L'objectif de cet article est de montrer que cette réforme peut être justifiée par une meilleure connaissance du fonctionnement des marchés. Nous montrons que, lorsque l'analyse des accords réalisée par la Commission est plutôt de mauvaise qualité, mieux vaut contrôler ex ante les accords. En revanche, si le jugement de la Commission s'améliore, conséquence d'une meilleure connaissance des différents secteurs de l'économie, un système de contrôle ex post est préférable pour le bien-être social.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Bergès-Sennou & Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud Vergé, 2002. "Modernisation de la politique communautaire de concurrence. Régime d'autorisation ou d'exception légale?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(3), pages 437-447.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_3_410415
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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2008. "The drivers of antitrust effectiveness," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 185(2), pages 69-88, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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