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L'arbitrage coût-disponibilité du crédit et la concentration de la dette. Une approche en termes de contrats séparants

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  • Frédéric Lobez
  • Jean-Christophe Statnik
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    Abstract

    [fre] Cet article présente un modèle des relations banques-entreprises en situation d'anti-sélection. L'asymétrie de l'information y est résolue par un double mécanisme : d'une part, les entreprises choisissent de diversifier plus ou moins leur approvisionnement en capitaux empruntés en nouant des relations avec un nombre donné d'établissements financiers ; les banques en infèrent alors une certaine information sur la qualité des débiteurs, ce qui permet d'aboutir à un équilibre semi-séparant ; d'autre part, les banques complètent la résolution de l'asymétrie de l'information en proposant des contrats séparants associant à un taux d'intérêt une probabilité de rationnement. Le modèle permet alors de relier les trois paramètres que sont la concentration de la dette, le coût et la disponibilité du crédit à une même caractéristique propre à chaque firme, son risque. En particulier, il est montré que les firmes les plus risquées choisissent de concentrer leur approvisionnement en capitaux empruntés. Les firmes moins risquées diversifient, quant à elles, leurs relations bancaires et limitent ainsi le risque de rationnement du crédit. Dans ce modèle, le rationnement est utilisé par les établissements financiers pour dissuader les entreprises de se faire passer pour moins risquées qu'elles ne sont en réalité. [eng] In this work, we built a model of bank-enterprise relationships in an adverse selection situation. The informational problem is resolved by a double device. First, firms choose the number of potential lenders, then banks deduce some information of debtors'quality, therefore, we obtain a semi-separating equilibrium. On the other hand, banks complete the solution of informational problem by using separating contracts where the separation is based on the pair (rate; likelihood of rationing). Then the model permits to link the debt concentration, the credit cost and the credit availability to the firm's risk. So, we show that more risky firms prefer fewer number of potential lenders. On the contrary, the fewer risky firms prefer more potential lenders: they limit the possibility of credit rationing.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

    Volume (Year): 52 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 6 ()
    Pages: 1227-1250

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_6_410382

    Note: DOI:10.2307/3503204
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    Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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