IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_2_408911.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L'allocation des ressources naturelles et le libéralisme

Author

Listed:
  • Serge-Christophe Kolm

Abstract

[fre] La théorie libérale légitimise des droits par leur origine à partir des « droits naturels » de chacun à soi-même (liberté) et de la liberté de cession ou d'abandon de droits (donc d'échange). Son problème central est par conséquent de définir la juste allocation des premiers droits aux ressources naturelles (bien que la valeur totale correspondante soit beaucoup plus faible que celle des fruits du travail). On analyse les diverses solutions en faisant valoir leurs traits plus ou moins libéraux, individualistes ou marchands. L'accord unanime où chacun peut céder ou abandonner de ses droits légitimes pour obtenir l'acquiescement d'autres, explicite ou implicite, a un statut privilégié. Mais on considère aussi le « premier occupant », le partage égal, l'allocation selon le besoin de cette ressource ou général, ou selon un mérite, la « publicisation » et ses suites plus ou moins marchandes, etc. On considère ensuite la théorie des compensations par lesquelles chaque bénéficiaire compense les autres du fait qu'ils ne le soient pas. On la trouve acceptable si chaque compensation est nette des compensations que celui qui la reçoit aurait lui-même cédées s'il avait perçu la ressource et, alors, possible si la ressource est vendable. On étudie les propriétés de cette règle, que l'exigence d'unanimité et le grand nombre de postulants peuvent faire tendre vers le partage égal. [eng] The allocation of natural resources and the theory of liberalism. Serge-Christophe Kolm. The theory of liberalism defines legitimate rights by their origin from the « natural rights » of each individual to himself (freedom) and from freedoms of cession and abandonment of rights (which implies freedom of exchange). Its central problem is thus to define the just allocation of first rights to natural resources (although the total corresponding value is much smaller than the one of labor's fruits). The various solutions are analyzed with special regard to their liberal or individualist or market features. Unanimous agreement in which each person may yield or abandon legiti­mate rights to obtain others' acceptance, whether explicit, or implicit in a « Liberal Social Contract », has a privileged status. But we also consider « first occupancy », equal shares, allocation according to need of the specifie resource or of general wealth, or according to some merit, publicization and its more or less market uses, etc. We then present the Theory of Compensations by which each beneficiary compensates others for not receiving the resource. It is found acceptable if from each compensation is deduced the compensations that its beneficiary would have paid had he received the resource, and, then, possible if the resource is salable. We analyze the properties of this rule, which a requirement of unanimous acceptance with a large number of persons may drive towards equal sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Serge-Christophe Kolm, 1986. "L'allocation des ressources naturelles et le libéralisme," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(2), pages 207-242.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_2_408911
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_2_408911
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_2_408911. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.