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Dodd-Frank, sauvetage des institutions financières et crise financière : le problème du too interconnected to fail

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  • James P. Hawley

Abstract

[eng] Dodd-Frank, Financial Institution Rescues and Financial Crisis : The Problem of Too Interconnected to Fail.. The article argues that a major omission in the Dodd-Frank financial reform act focuses on the problem of to interconnected to fail banks and non-bank (shadow) banks. While Dodd-Frank promises “no more” bailouts of too big to fail banks (TBTF) and non-bank banks, the paradox of a lacking a major focus on too interconnected to fail institutions (TITF) is actually to : increase systemic risk under some conditions ; and create a “ back door” set of complex and contorted processes to “ bailout” financial institutions in spite of political promises not to. This is accomplished by removing ‘ bailout’ authority from the Federal Reserve and creating an Orderly Liquidation Authority modelled on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which along with the Department of the Treasury can in fact “bailout” financial institutions under certain conditions. Yet this new authority may fail given its focus on TBTF rather than (as well) TITF structures. . Classification JEL : G01, G18, G21, G28. [fre] Cet article soutient qu’il y a une omission importante dans la réforme financière Dodd-Frank, à savoir la question des institutions financières « trop interconnectées pour faire faillite » (too interconnected to fail, TITF). Si le Dodd-Frank Act promet qu’il n’y aura plus de sauvetages des banques et des banques non-banques (shadow banks) too big to fail (TBTF), le paradoxe qu’il y a à ne pas porter attention aux institutions TITF aura en fait pour conséquences d’augmenter le risque systémique dans certaines conditions, et d’instaurer un jeu de mécanismes complexes et compliqués pour « sauver » des institutions financières, en dépit des promesses politiques de ne plus le faire. C’est ce qui est fait lorsque l’on retire le pouvoir de « sauvetage » à la Réserve fédérale et que l’on crée une Orderly Liquidation Authority sur le modèle de la Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation qui, avec le département du Trésor, peut en réalité « sauver » les institutions financières dans certaines conditions. Mais cette nouvelle autorité pourrait échouer parce qu’elle se concentre uniquement sur les TBTF et omet de s’intéresser (aussi) aux structures TITF. . Classification JEL : G01, G18, G21, G28.

Suggested Citation

  • James P. Hawley, 2012. "Dodd-Frank, sauvetage des institutions financières et crise financière : le problème du too interconnected to fail," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 105(1), pages 251-263.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2012_num_105_1_5974
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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