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Les externalités des systèmes de paiement : questions pour l'Europe

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  • Dirk Schoenmacker

Abstract

[eng] Externalities in payment systems : issues for Europe . The fast growing volume of financial and commercial transactions settled through large value payment systems has raised supervisory concerns. The article focuses on the externalities in payment systems and the appropriate role of the Central Bank in preserving the stability of the financial system. A conceptual framework is developed to analyse some key features of the main settlement systems. In net settlement, participants send payment messages throughout the day but only settle their net positions at the end of the day. The major risk is that a failure to settle by one bank may lead to settlement failures of others due to unexpected liquidity shortfalls and, thus, may trigger a systemic crisis. To prevent such a systemic crisis, the Central Bank may feel compelled to support the failing participant and will then become effectively the implicit guarantor of the system. To avoid their exposure in the payment system, Central Banks have been implementing risk reduction policies. A rigorous way of eliminating credit exposure is designing a gross settlement system without daylight exposures. But banks need then collateral or reserves before making payments. A lack of liquid funds could lead to settlement delays and, even worse, to a gridlock of the system, a new externality. Finally, the implications of payment systems for banking supervision and monetary policy are examined against the background of the role of a prospective European Central Bank. appropriate role of the Central Bank in preserving the stability of the financial system. A conceptual framework is developed to analyse some key features of the main settlement systems. In net settlement, participants send payment messages throughout the day but only settle their net positions at the end of the day. The major risk is that a failure to settle by one bank may lead to settlement failures of others due to unexpected liquidity shortfalls and, thus, may trigger a systemic crisis. To prevent such a systemic crisis, the Central Bank may feel compelled to support the failing participant and will then become effectively the implicit guarantor of the system. To avoid their exposure in the payment system, Central Banks have been implementing risk reduction policies. A rigorous way of eliminating credit exposure is designing a gross settlement system without daylight exposures. But banks need then collateral or reserves before making payments. A lack of liquid funds could lead to settlement delays and, even worse, to a gridlock of the system, a new externality. Finally, the implications of payment systems for banking supervision and monetary policy are examined against the background of the role of a prospective European Central Bank. [fre] Le rapide développement des transactions financières et commerciales réglées au travers de systèmes de paiement pour grands montants a fait naître des questions à propos d'un renforcement de la surveillance et du contrôle de ces systèmes. Cet article est axé sur les externalités des systèmes de paiement et le rôle approprié de la Banque centrale en tant que garant de la stabilité du système financier. Un cadre conceptuel a été développé afin d'analyser quelques caractéristiques clés des principaux systèmes de règlement. Pour les règlements compensés, les participants transmettent leurs ordres de paiement pendant la journée, mais ne règlent leurs positions qu'en fin de journée. Le risque majeur est qu'un défaut de règlement d'une banque peut entraîner le défaut de règlement d'autres établissements, en raison d'une soudaine insuffisance de liquidité et, par conséquent, déclencher une crise systémique. Afin d'éviter une telle crise, . la Banque centrale peut se sentir obligée d'aider le participant défaillant et devenir par là même le garant implicite du système. C'est pour devancer les problèmes liés aux systèmes de paiement que les Banques centrales ont mis en place des politiques de réduction des risques. Une manière stricte d'éliminer le risque de crédit est de concevoir un système de règlement brut sans position pendant la journée. Néanmoins, les banques ont besoin d'un collatéral ou de réserves avant d'effectuer les paiements. Un manque de liquidités peut conduire à des retards de paiement et, pis encore, à un blocage du système, une nouvelle externalité. Finalement, les implications des systèmes de paiement sur la supervision bancaire et la politique monétaire sont examinées sous l'angle du rôle de la future Banque centrale européenne.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Schoenmacker, 1995. "Les externalités des systèmes de paiement : questions pour l'Europe," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(2), pages 217-245.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_1995_num_33_2_2476
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.1995.2476
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.1995.2476
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