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Incentive Contracts in Utility Regulation

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  • Matthew Bennett
  • Catherine Waddams Price

Abstract

[eng] This paper traces the development and challenges of incentive contracts in regulation of utilities, illustrated by the British experience. We first address the question of why regulation is needed and examine regulation in a simple principal agent framework. We then trace the growth and development of incentive contracts such as price cap, and assess the introduction of competition. Finally we identify practical issues which have marred the original concept of incentive regulation, and assess the prospects for future development. [fre] Ce papier retrace le développement des contrats incitatifs dans la réglementation des industries de service public et les défis rencontrés, comme l'a illustré l'expérience britannique. Nous nous demandons tout d'abord pourquoi une réglementation est nécessaire et nous examinons la réglementation dans un cadre simple de Principal/Agent. Ensuite, nous retraçons la croissance et le développement des contrats incitatifs comme les Price Caps, puis nous évaluons les effets de l'introduction de la concurrence. Nous terminons en identifiant les problèmes pratiques qui ont gâché le succès initial du concept original de réglementation incitative, et nous évaluons les perspectives de développement futur.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Bennett & Catherine Waddams Price, 2000. "Incentive Contracts in Utility Regulation," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 361-384.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_2000_num_92_1_1057
    DOI: 10.3406/rei.2000.1057
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.2000.1057
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