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Stanovení nabídkových cen ve veřejných zakázkách: simulace
[Price Determination in Public Procurement: Simulation]

Author

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  • Martin Schmidt

Abstract

The article examines a mechanism of bid price determination in public procurement by individual tenderers. An auction model based on game theory, which maximizes expected profit of a firm bidding for public contract, is used to analyse this process. Firm within the model decides by comparing expected profit and transaction costs associated with submitting the bid whether to submit the bid or not. Furthermore, the article analyzes empirical data on public works contracts in the field of construction and reconstruction of wastewater treatment plants in the Czech Republic. The probability distribution of bid prices submitted by individual firms is mainly examined on these data. Based on the presented model and some finding from the data, a simulation of sequential biddings is executed consequently in which individual firms in their decision making use available data on submitted bids from the previous contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Schmidt, 2016. "Stanovení nabídkových cen ve veřejných zakázkách: simulace [Price Determination in Public Procurement: Simulation]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2016(5), pages 541-558.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2016:y:2016:i:5:id:1087:p:541-558
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1087
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    simulation; Public Procurement; competitive bidding; bids; bid prices;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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