IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlpol/v2000y2000i2id129.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Jaké jsou náklady a výnosy privatizace?
[What are the costs and benefits of privatization?]

Author

Listed:
  • Marek Kapička

Abstract

The article analyzes the issue of privatization from theoretical point of view. An incomplete contracts approach is used in the analysis. Formal model is presented, showing how contractual incompleteness affects the extent of restructuring. The conclusion is, that if the government cannot commit not to subsidize the firm in exchange for higher production, restructuring effort will be lower than optimal. The reason is that higher restructuring decreases future subsidies. The government thus creates soft budget constraint for the owner. However, privatization improves upon state ownership. If we introduce partial privatization, more complicated governance structures emerge. Rights to cash-flow and rights to control are distinguished. One of the principal conclusions is that these rights are highly complementary. Privatization should therefore include transfer of both of these rights toward the new owner.

Suggested Citation

  • Marek Kapička, 2000. "Jaké jsou náklady a výnosy privatizace? [What are the costs and benefits of privatization?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2000(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2000:y:2000:i:2:id:129
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.129
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://polek.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.polek.129.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18267/j.polek.129?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2000:y:2000:i:2:id:129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stanislav Vojir (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.