AbstractThis article shows that the altruism of the donator could have different forms. The specific form of his optimisation criterion significantly influences his decision making concerning the allocation of his resources among recipients. Moreover, even within one chosen criterion we could report sudden changes in strategy of a rational donator. This donator, even if he is so called 'hard altruist' (i.e. subject preferring community interests to his individual interests), he could be forced to make a 'gambit', when he sacrifices one from the subjects supported in favour of survival of the community as a whole. This preferring of whole community to individual interests could lead to liquidation of the least resistant member of the community. This is quite surprising as this member of the community was the most heavily supported before. Altruism could be cruel.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Prague Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 2005 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Postal: Editorial office Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Czech Republic
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