Punishment and Grace: On the Economics of Tax Amnesties
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance = Finances publiques.
Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, 2005. "Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 265-279, May.
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- Bruno Chiarini & Marco Di Domizio & Elisabetta Marzano, 2009. "Why Do Underground Reducing Policies Often Fail Their Scope? Some Answers From The Italian Experience," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 308-318, 07.
- Julio López Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo Sauco, . "Incidencia de la amnistía fiscal de 1991 en el cumplimiento a largo plazo en el IRPF," Studies on the Spanish Economy 106, FEDEA.
- Julio López Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo Sauco, 2002. "El análisis económico de las amnistías fiscales: ¿Qué hemos aprendido hasta ahora?," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 163(4), pages 121-153, December.
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