Stabilization Programs and External Enforcement: Experience from the 1920s
AbstractCredibility and financing problems are important reasons why countries may seek to involve external institutions in the design and implementation of stabilization programs. In particular, governments may rely on external institutions to "enforce" programs that would otherwise lack credibility. This paper analyzes six European currency stabilizations sponsored by the League of Nations in the 1920s. It emphasizes the means by which the League provided a "commitment technology" and enforced compliance, thereby helping to ensure successful stabilizations. Empirical evidence indicates that countries with greater credibility problems relied more heavily on external enforcement to stabilize their currencies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund.
Volume (Year): 40 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
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- Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December.
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