Pascal Belan (CREST, INSEE, Paris, France) Philippe Michel (GREQAM, University of the Mediterranian, IUF and CORE) Pierre Pestieau () (CREPP, Université de Liège and CORE, Université de Louvain; 7, Boulevard du Rectorat, Liège 4000, Belgium.)
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It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security system implies a welfare loss for the transition generation—that is, the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for its own retirement and, second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired generation. This article shows that in a setting of endogenous growth with positive externality such a transition can be Pareto improving. But it argues also that social security reform is more a pretext than a requirement for internalizing such a positive externality. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1998) 23, 119–125. doi:10.1023/A:1008622110502
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Volume (Year): 23 (1998) Issue (Month): 2 (December) Pages: 119-125 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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