The Relationship between Medicare Supplemental Insurance and Health-care Spending: Selection Across Multiple Dimensions
AbstractThis paper investigates Medicare supplemental insurance and health-care spending. The empirical models attempt to determine whether seniors who possess certain traits, particularly health- and risk-related factors, choose supplemental coverage based on expectations of health-care needs. Employer-provided supplemental coverage is considered separately from official “Medigap” policies. Results indicate favorable selection into supplemental insurance based on health status, but no selection based on risk attitudes. The models indicate that Medigap and employer-provided enrollees spend approximately $1,000 and $1,500 more annually, respectively, than those without supplemental coverage. Finally, moral hazard induced by Medicare supplemental coverage appears to add $5.5 billion annually to the federal budget, although this estimate lacks statistical significance.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 38 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/
Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elizabeth Gale).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.