Survey Article: Optimal Tautness and the Economics of Incentives in Bureaucracies
AbstractThis paper reviews the economic literature which deals with the tautness of plans and with its relevance to macroeconomic pressures in Soviet-type economies. It opens with a discussion of Kornai 's shortage economy, a systemic approach to pressure, which is an alternative to the plan-related tautness coined by Hunter, and deals tautness from the agency angle, both in a static framework and in a dynamic, ratchet-related, framework.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Comparative Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 35 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK
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- Brixiova, Zuzana & Bulir, Ales, 2003. "Output performance under central planning: a model of poor incentives," Economic Systems, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 27-39, March.
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