Land Tenure, Investment Incentives, and the Choice of Techniques: Evidence from Nicaragua
AbstractThe choice of cultivation techniques is a key determinant of agricultural productivity and has important consequences for income growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. Household data from Nicaragua are used to show that the choice of cultivation technique depends on farmers' tenure status even when techniques are observable and contractible. In particular, tree crops are less likely to be grown on rented than on owner-cultivated plots. Further evidence indicates that the result follows from landlords' inability or unwillingness to commit to long-term tenancy contracts rather than from agency costs due to risk aversion or limited liability. Copyright The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / the world bank . All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: email@example.com, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Bank Group in its journal The World Bank Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 21 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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