Competition and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers
AbstractThe role of the medium of exchange in competition among bidders and its effect on returns to stockholders in corporate takeovers are investigated. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, our model shows that stockholders of both acquiring and target firms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed with cash rather than equity, and that returns to target shareholders increase with competition. The model predicts that the fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the level of synergy. Finally, it is shown that, as competition increases, the cash component of the offer as well as the proportion of cash offered increases. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 3 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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