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Political Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Qingyuan Li
  • Chen Lin
  • Li Xu

Abstract

Using a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years. (JEL G18, G30, G32, E22)Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Qingyuan Li & Chen Lin & Li Xu, 2020. "Political Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(7), pages 3088-3129.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:7:p:3088-3129.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhz090
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wei-Fong Pan, 2023. "Does a firm’s lobbying activity respond to its peers’ lobbying activity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 297-324, March.
    2. Dong, Xiao & Yu, Mingzhe, 2023. "Does FinTech development facilitate firms' innovation? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    3. Oleksandr Talavera & Shuxing Yin & Mao Zhang, 2022. "Political motives of excess leverage in state-owned firms," Discussion Papers 22-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    4. Goodell, John & Li, Mingsheng & Liu, Desheng, 2021. "Price informativeness and state-owned enterprises: Considering their heterogeneity," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    5. Qingyuan Li & Edward L. Maydew & Richard H. Willis & Li Xu, 2023. "Taxes and director independence: evidence from board reforms worldwide," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 910-957, June.
    6. Wu, Zhenshu, 2023. "Essays in corporate finance and ESG," Other publications TiSEM fe6f9604-d0c5-46f3-9492-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Su, Zhiwei & Xue, Yi, 2023. "Takeover deterrence with state ownership: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    8. Xuan Tian & Jiajie Xu, 2022. "Do Place-Based Policies Promote Local Innovation and Entrepreneurship? [A model of growth through creative destruction]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 595-635.
    9. Jin Wang & Zihan Hong & Hai Long, 2023. "Digital Transformation Empowers ESG Performance in the Manufacturing Industry: From ESG to DESG," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, October.
    10. Pan, Jianping & Weng, Ruoyu & Yin, Sirui & Fu, Xiaoqing (Maggie), 2022. "Central supervision and earnings management: Quasi-experimental evidence from China," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity

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