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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany

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  • Lammertjan Dam
  • Michael Koetter

Abstract

We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995--2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 25 (2012)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Pages: 2343-2380

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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:25:y:2012:i:8:p:2343-2380

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Cited by:
  1. Barros, Carlos Pestana & Williams, Jonathan, 2013. "The random parameters stochastic frontier cost function and the effectiveness of public policy: Evidence from bank restructuring in Mexico," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 98-108.
  2. Florian Hett & Alexander Schmidt, 2013. "Bank Bailouts and Market Discipline: How Bailout Expectations Changed During the Financial Crisis," Working Papers 1305, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
  3. Claudia Lambert & Felix Noth & Ulrich Schüwer, 2013. "How Do Insured Deposits Affect Bank Risk?: Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1347, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  4. Hett, Florian & Schmidt, Alexander, 2013. "Bank rescues and bailout expectations: The erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis," SAFE Working Paper Series 36, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
  5. Kick, Thomas & Ruprecht, Benedikt & Onali, Enrico & Schaeck, Klaus, 2014. "Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation: Evidence from household and firm portfolios," Discussion Papers 07/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  6. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
  7. Koetter, Michael, 2013. "Market structure and competition in German banking: Modules I and IV," Working Papers 06/2013, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
  8. Jeong-Bon Kim & Li Li & Mary L. Z. Ma & Frank M. Song, 2013. "CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry," Working Papers 182013, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  9. Korte, Josef, 2013. "Catharsis - The real effects of bank insolvency and resolution," Discussion Papers 21/2013, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  10. Liu, Wai-Man & Ngo, Phong, 2012. "Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure," MPRA Paper 43603, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Hryckiewicz, Aneta, 2014. "The problem with government interventions: The wrong banks, inadequate strategies, or ineffective measures?," MPRA Paper 56730, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Luis Brandao-Marques & Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza, 2013. "International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector," International Finance Discussion Papers 1086, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  13. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi, 2014. "Bankers' compensation: Sprint swimming in short bonus pools?," Research Discussion Papers 2/2014, Bank of Finland.
  14. Lambert, Claudia & Noth, Felix & Schüwer, Ulrich, 2013. "How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 emergency economic stabilization act," SAFE Working Paper Series 38, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.

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