This article studies information blockages and the asymmetric release of information in a security market with fixed setup costs of trading. In this setting, "sidelined" investors may delay trading until price movements validate their private signals. Trading thereby internally generates the arrival of further news to the market. This leads to (1) negative skewness following price run-ups and positive skewness following price rundowns (even though the model is ex ante symmetric), (2) a lack of correspondence between large price changes and the arrival of external information, and (3) increases in volatility following large price changes. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 15 (2002) Issue (Month): 2 (March) Pages: 615-648 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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