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Empty Promises and Arbitrage

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Author Info
Willard, Gregory A
Dybvig, Philip H

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Abstract

Analysis of absence of arbitrage normally ignores payoffs in states to which the agent assigns zero probability. We extend the fundamental theorem of asset pricing to the case of 'no empty promises' in which the agent cannot promise arbitrarily large payments in some states. There is a superpositive pricing rule that can assign positive price to claims in zero probability states important to the market as well as assigning positive prices to claims in the states of positive probability. With continuous information arrival, no empty promises can be enforced by shutting down the agent's subsequent investments once wealth hits zero. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 12 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 807-34
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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:12:y:1999:i:4:p:807-34

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  1. Sergey Iskoz & Jiang Wang, 2003. "How to Tell if a Money Manager Knows More?," NBER Working Papers 9791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jaime A. Londo\~no, 2003. "State Tameness: A New Approach for Credit Constrains," Quantitative Finance Papers math/0305274, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2004. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-25.


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