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A Wealth-Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism

Author

Listed:
  • Martien Lubberink
  • Carel Huijgen

Abstract

This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers. JEL classification: G14, G38, M41.

Suggested Citation

  • Martien Lubberink & Carel Huijgen, 2001. "A Wealth-Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 5(3), pages 323-349.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:5:y:2001:i:3:p:323-349.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1013887921233
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    Cited by:

    1. Bill Francis & Iftekhar Hasan & Jong Chool Park & Qiang Wu, 2015. "Gender Differences in Financial Reporting Decision Making: Evidence from Accounting Conservatism," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(3), pages 1285-1318, September.
    2. Pascal Dumontier & Bernard Raffournier, 2002. "Accounting and capital markets: a survey of the European evidence," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 119-151.
    3. Carel Huijgen & Martien Lubberink, 2005. "Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(7‐8), pages 1275-1309, September.
    4. Juan Manuel Garcia Lara & Araceli Mora, 2004. "Balance sheet versus earnings conservatism in Europe," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 261-292.
    5. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Wu, Qiang & Park, Jong Chool, 2014. "Gender differences in financial reporting decision-making: Evidence from accounting conservatism," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 1/2014, Bank of Finland.
    6. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2014_001 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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