Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk
AbstractThis paper investigates the role of banking supervision in controlling bank risk. Banking supervision is measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions). Our results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, while the relationship between sanctions and risk appears to be linear and negative. We also consider the combined effect of effective supervision and banking regulation (in the form of capital and market discipline requirements) on bank risk. We find that effective supervision and market discipline requirements are important and complementary mechanisms in reducing bank fragility. This is in contrast to capital requirements, which prove to be rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher volume of on-site audits and sanctions. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Finance Association in its journal Review of Finance.
Volume (Year): 15 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Vollmer, Uwe & Wiese, Harald, 2013. "Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 487-497.
- Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis & Tsoumas, Chris, 2013. "Enforcement actions and bank behavior," MPRA Paper 43557, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Amidu, Mohammed, 2013. "The effects of the structure of banking market and funding strategy on risk and return," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 143-155.
- Yener Altunbas & Michiel van Leuvensteijn & David Marques-Ibanez, 2013. "Competition And Bank Risk: The Role Of Securitization And Bank Capital," Working Papers 13005, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
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